2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

• 1. Historical Context And Background

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  In 2013, Ukraine's parliament overwhelmingly approved finalising an association agreement with the European Union. Russia put pressure on Ukraine to reject the agreement and imposed economic sanctions on the country. Kremlin adviser Sergei Glazyev warned in September 2013 that if Ukraine signed the EU agreement, Russia would no longer acknowledge Ukraine's borders. In November, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych suddenly withdrew from signing the agreement, choosing closer ties to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union instead. This coerced withdrawal triggered a wave of protests known as Euromaidan, culminating in the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014. Almost 100 protesters were killed. Despite signing an agreement, Yanukovych fled. Parliament voted to remove him and he ended up in Russia. Russian soldiers with no insignia occupied the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, and seized the Crimean Parliament. Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, after a widely disputed referendum held under occupation. Pro-Russian protests immediately followed in the Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. The war in Donbas began in April 2014 when armed Russian mercenaries led by Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin seized Sloviansk and nearby towns. Russian troops were covertly involved in the fighting. The Minsk agreements, signed in September 2014 and February 2015, aimed to resolve the conflict, but ceasefires and further negotiations repeatedly failed.

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• 2. Prelude And Military Buildup

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  There was a large Russian military build-up near Ukraine's borders in March and April 2021, and again in both Russia and Belarus from October 2021 onward. Members of the Russian government, including Putin, denied having plans to attack or invade Ukraine up until the day before the invasion. While Russian troops massed on Ukraine's borders, Russia's proxy forces launched thousands of attacks on Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe reported more than 90,000 ceasefire violations throughout 2021; the vast majority in Russian-controlled territory. In July 2021, Putin published an essay On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, in which he called Ukraine historically Russian lands and claimed there is no historical basis for the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians. In December 2021, Russia issued an ultimatum to the West, which included demands that NATO end all activity in its Eastern European member states and ban Ukraine or any other former Soviet state from ever joining the alliance. Several Western political analysts suggested Russia knew that its unrealistic demands would be rejected, which would give it a pretext to invade. Political scientists Michael McFaul and Robert Person said Russia's occupation of Crimea and the Donbas since 2014 had already blocked Ukraine's NATO membership, suggesting that Putin's real aim was to subjugate Ukraine.

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• 3. Initial Invasion Strategies And Fronts

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  The invasion began at dawn on the 24th of February. Fighting began in Luhansk Oblast at 3:40 a.m. Kyiv time near Milove on the border with Russia. The main infantry and tank attacks were launched in four spearheads, creating a northern front launched towards Kyiv from Belarus, a southern front from Crimea, a southeastern front from Russian-controlled Donbas, and an eastern front from Russia towards Kharkiv and Sumy. Russian vehicles were subsequently marked with a white Z military symbol, believed to be a measure to prevent friendly fire. Immediately after the invasion began, Zelenskyy declared martial law in Ukraine in a first video speech. The same evening, he ordered a general mobilisation of all Ukrainian males between 18 and 60 years old, prohibiting them from leaving the country. Wagner Group mercenaries and Kadyrovites contracted by the Kremlin reportedly made several attempts to assassinate Zelenskyy, including an operation involving several hundred mercenaries meant to infiltrate Kyiv with the aim of killing the Ukrainian president. The United States contacted Zelenskyy and offered to help him flee the country, lest the Russian Army attempt to kidnap or kill him on seizing Kyiv; Zelenskyy responded that The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride.

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• 4. Ukrainian Resistance And Counterattacks

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  The Russian invasion was unexpectedly met by fierce Ukrainian resistance. In Kyiv, Russia failed to take the city and was repulsed in the battles of Irpin, Hostomel, and Bucha. The Russians tried to encircle the capital, but its defenders under Oleksandr Syrskyi held their ground, effectively using Western Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to thin Russian supply lines and stall the offensive. On the 25th of March, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kyiv resulted in several towns, including Makariv, being retaken to the east and west of Kyiv. As part of a general retreat of Russian forces north of Kyiv, as well as attacks on Russian formations by the Ukrainian military, Russian troops in the Bucha area retreated north by the end of March. Ukrainian forces entered the city on the 1st of April. Ukraine claimed to recapture the entire region around Kyiv, including Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel, by the 2nd of April, with evidence of war crimes being uncovered in Bucha. By the 7th of April, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said that the Russian retraction, resupply, and redeployment of their troops from the Kyiv area should be interpreted as an expansion of Putin's plans for his military actions against Ukraine.

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• 5. Military Analysis Of Tactical Failures

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  Writing in 2024, Michael Kofman attributed the failure of the Russian invasion to unworkable concept of operations, which did not anticipate or plan to engage an organised and sustained Ukrainian defence. He attacked the road-bound deployment of Russian forces during the invasion, as well as the excessive reliance of the invasion plan on subversion and special operations such as the airborne attack at Hostomel. The November 2022 Royal United Services Institute report on the invasion also criticised the invasion plan as being based on false assumptions, and spreading Russian forces too thinly across too many objectives, with insufficient contingency-planning for what to do if things went wrong. Writing in 2025, Alexander Hill, professor of military history at the University of Calgary, described Russian BTGs as lacking the requisite level of infantry support for their armour that was being unimaginatively funnelled down relatively narrow axes of advance. He stated that Russian officers struggled to command multiple BTGs to good effect. Analysts from the Swiss Military Academy at ETH Zurich characterised the invasion plan as being predicated on a rapid, decisive overthrow of the government in Kyiv, presuming minimal resistance. They also criticised what they saw as the excessively rigid, Soviet-style command structure and operational planning of Russian forces during the invasion.

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• 6. International Condemnation And Sanctions

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  On the 2nd of March 2022 and on the 23rd of February 2023, 141 member states of the UN General Assembly voted for a resolution saying that Russia should immediately withdraw. Seven, including Russia, voted against the measure. Political reactions to the invasion included new sanctions imposed on Russia, which triggered widespread economic effects on the Russian and world economies. Sanctions forced Russia to reorient its oil exports to non-sanctioning countries such as India, rely more on LNG, and shift its coal exports from Europe to Asia. Most European countries cancelled nuclear cooperation with Russia. Over seventy sovereign states and the European Union delivered humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and nearly fifty countries plus the EU provided military aid. Economic sanctions included a ban on Russian aircraft using EU airspace, a ban of certain Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system, and a ban on certain Russian media outlets. In March 2022, Antwerp mayor Bart De Wever said that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not end Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as he is a psychopath and a madman. He had earlier assessed that Vladimir Putin and Adolf Hitler were similarly motivated: Germany was humiliated after the First World War, Russia after the Cold War.

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• 7. War Crimes And Legal Accountability

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  Ukraine claimed to recapture the entire region around Kyiv, including Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel, by the 2nd of April, with evidence of war crimes being uncovered in Bucha. The International Criminal Court opened an investigation into war crimes and issued arrest warrants for Putin and several other Russian officials. On the 14th of March, Russian forces conducted multiple cruise missile attacks on a military training facility in Yavoriv, Lviv Oblast, close to the Polish border. Local governor Maksym Kozytskyy reported that at least 35 people had been killed in the attacks. By the 18th of March, Mariupol was completely encircled and fighting reached the city centre, hampering efforts to evacuate civilians. On the 20th of March, an art school sheltering around 400 people, was destroyed by Russian bombs. The Russians demanded surrender, and the Ukrainians refused. On the 27th of March, Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna said that more than 85 percent of the whole town is destroyed. In August, Ukrainian forces began liberating territories in the north-east and south. From then through 2023, Russian offensives and Ukrainian counteroffensives gained only small amounts of territory.

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