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2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ch. 1 of 8
— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

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2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

8 sections
  • Vladimir Putin announced the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine before 5 a.m. Kyiv time on the 24th of February, calling it a "special military operation." Fighting began at 3:40 a.m. near Milove, a village in Luhansk Oblast on the Russian border. The invasion was the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II.

    Putin claimed the operation was to protect people in the Russian-backed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. He also claimed, without evidence, that Ukraine's government were neo-Nazis committing genocide against ethnic Russians. He denied Ukraine's legitimacy as a state and called for its "demilitarisation and denazification." He said he had no plans to occupy Ukraine.

    What he actually planned, what his military believed it could accomplish, and how the defenders of a country many expected to fall within days managed to hold their capital, is a story that stretches back nearly a decade. It involves a trade agreement never signed, an annexation conducted under military occupation, and eight years of war before the full invasion began.

  • In September 2013, Kremlin adviser Sergei Glazyev warned that if Ukraine signed an EU association agreement, Russia would no longer acknowledge Ukraine's borders. His warning was delivered before the first shots were fired. Its logic would shape the decade that followed.

    Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych had been preparing to sign the EU agreement. In November 2013, he abruptly reversed course, choosing instead to align with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. That decision triggered mass protests called Euromaidan. The protests culminated in the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014. Almost 100 protesters were killed. Yanukovych fled to Russia.

    Russian soldiers with no insignia then occupied Crimea, seizing the Crimean Parliament. Russia annexed the territory in March 2014 after a referendum held under military occupation. Armed Russian mercenaries led by Igor "Strelkov" Girkin seized Sloviansk in April 2014, starting the war in Donbas. Russian troops were covertly involved in the fighting from the beginning. The Minsk agreements, signed in September 2014 and again in February 2015, aimed to stop the fighting but repeatedly failed.

    By July 2021, Putin published an essay called "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." He wrote that Ukraine was "historically Russian lands" and that there was "no historical basis" for viewing Ukrainians as a people distinct from Russians. Writing in 2024, scholars Michael McFaul and Robert Person described this essay as expressing not just "cynical propaganda" but Putin's "deeply held and internalized beliefs."

    In December 2021, Russia issued an ultimatum to the West demanding that NATO permanently bar Ukraine from membership and end all military activity in Eastern Europe. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg replied that "Russia has no veto" on whether Ukraine joins and "has no right to establish a sphere of influence." French president Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met Putin in February 2022 to dissuade him from acting. According to Scholz, Putin told him Ukraine should not be an independent state.

    OSCE observers had recorded more than 90,000 ceasefire violations in the Donbas throughout 2021, the vast majority in Russian-controlled territory, as the troop buildup on Ukraine's borders continued into early 2022.

  • Documents found inside captured Russian tanks described the operation as ending within ten days. Russian forces also carried parade uniforms and "flagship" tanks of the kind used in military ceremonies, suggesting Russia expected to stage a victory parade in Kyiv after a swift conquest.

    The Royal United Services Institute later reported the full scope of what Russia had planned. After defeating Ukraine and capturing or killing its government, the plan called for "mopping up" operations, filtration camps, occupation regimes, and eventual annexation. The decision to invade was reportedly made by Putin and a small circle including national security adviser Nikolai Patrushev and defence minister Sergei Shoigu.

    The belief that Kyiv could fall in three days was not only internal. Aleksandr Lukashenko and Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the Russian state broadcaster RT, reinforced the three-day narrative publicly. A captured Russian soldier said in a video released by Ukrainian security services that his unit had been sent with food for only three days. Putin himself had said in 2014 that Russian forces "could take Ukraine in two weeks."

    Three days after the invasion began, the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti accidentally published a pre-written article called "Russia's Coming and the New World." It had been prepared in advance and declared that "Ukraine had returned to Russia." Russia also sent Zelenskyy an ultimatum demanding he step down and be replaced with Viktor Medvedchuk.

    Russian regular forces numbered nearly 150,000 troops, organized into about 140 Battalion Tactical Groups. Including proxy forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, total Russian-controlled forces reached as many as 200,000. Russia entered Ukraine with roughly 2,800 combat-ready tanks. Ukraine had approximately 900 battle-ready tanks, most reconditioned from older models, particularly T-64B and T-64-BM variants built up largely between 2014 and 2018.

    Forces from the Eastern Military District under Aleksandr Chaiko were assigned two axes converging on Kyiv: one from Belarus, the other from the Bryansk region, intended to encircle the capital from both sides of the Dnieper. The 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies formed the core of this northern advance. Their mission was to surround Kyiv before any organized defence could be mounted.

  • The United States contacted Zelenskyy on the 24th of February and offered to evacuate him from Kyiv. He responded with words The Washington Post would later call "one of the most-cited lines of the Russian invasion." His response was: "The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride." The paper noted the quote came from a single source and could not be fully confirmed.

    Zelenskyy appeared in video messages on the 24th, 25th, and the 26th of February confirming he was still in Kyiv alongside his cabinet. Wagner Group mercenaries reportedly made several attempts to assassinate him. Ukrainian officials said anti-war members within Russia's FSB had shared those plans with them, allowing Ukraine to take precautions.

    Russian Airborne Forces attempted on the 26th of February to seize two airfields near Kyiv: Antonov Airport and the air base at Vasylkiv. Russian forces advancing from Belarus gained control of the ghost town of Chernobyl. As of the 5th of March, a Russian convoy reportedly 64 km in length had made little progress toward Kyiv.

    The Royal United Services Institute assessed Russian performance from the north and east as "stalled." Russian forces captured Bucha, Hostomel, and Vorzel by the 5th of March, though Irpin remained contested as of the 9th of March. By the 11th of March, the lengthy convoy had largely dispersed, with vehicles taking up positions under tree cover.

    Ukraine's defenders under Oleksandr Syrskyi held the capital. Ukrainian forces used Western-supplied Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to thin Russian supply lines and stall the offensive. Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the invasion a "historic watershed" on the 27th of February, the same evening Putin placed Russia's nuclear deterrence on alert.

    On the 16th of March, Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive around Kyiv. By the 25th of March, towns including Makariv had been retaken. Russian troops in the Bucha area retreated north by the end of March. Ukrainian forces entered Bucha on the 1st of April. By the 2nd of April, Ukraine had recaptured the entire region around Kyiv, including Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel. Evidence of war crimes was uncovered there immediately.

    By the 7th of April, Russian forces had pulled back from the northern front entirely, to resupply and redeploy to southeastern Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described this retreat as preparation for an expanded campaign concentrated in the southeast.

  • On the 24th of February, Russian forces took control of the North Crimean Canal, which had been cut off from the Dnieper river since 2014. Russian troops took Kherson, the first major Ukrainian city to fall, by the 2nd of March. The siege of Mariupol began on the 26th of February as Russian forces moved east from Crimea to link up with separatist-held Donbas.

    By the 18th of March, Mariupol was completely encircled and fighting had reached the city centre. Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna said on the 27th of March that "more than 85 percent of the whole town is destroyed." On the 20th of March, Russian bombs destroyed an art school sheltering around 400 people. Ukraine's defenders refused Russian demands to surrender.

    Putin told Emmanuel Macron in a phone call on the 29th of March that bombardment would only stop when Ukrainians surrendered. On the 1st of April, Russia refused safe passage to 50 buses sent by the United Nations to evacuate civilians, while peace talks continued in Istanbul. Mariupol fell to Russian forces by the 20th of May 2022.

    On the 24th of February, a Russian naval cruiser and a patrol boat bombarded Snake Island with their deck guns. Russian forces instructed the Ukrainian soldiers stationed there to surrender. Their response, "Russian warship, go fuck yourself!", became one of the war's most widely shared phrases. A detachment of Russian soldiers then landed and took control of the island.

    Turkey invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention on the 28th of February. This sealed off the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Russian warships not based in the Black Sea, preventing four Russian naval vessels from passing through. On the 3rd of March, Ukraine scuttled its own frigate, the flagship of the Ukrainian navy, in the port of Mykolaiv to prevent its capture.

    In Mykolaiv Oblast, Russian forces advanced as far as Voznesensk before being repelled and pushed back south. On the 24th of March, Ukrainian officials said a Russian landing ship docked in Berdiansk was destroyed by a Ukrainian rocket attack, while the southern push toward Odesa continued under bombardment.

  • On the 25th of February, Ukrainian forces struck the Millerovo air base in Russia using OTR-21 Tochka missiles. Ukrainian officials said the attack destroyed several Russian Air Force planes and set the base on fire. The strike was among the war's earliest signs that Ukraine intended to take the fight beyond its own borders.

    In the east, Russian forces pressed toward Kharkiv, a major city less than 35 km from the Russian border, and met fierce resistance. On the 1st of March, Denis Pushilin, head of the Donetsk People's Republic, announced that DPR forces had almost completely surrounded Volnovakha. On the 2nd of March, Russian forces were repelled from Sievierodonetsk. Ukrainian forces that same day launched a counteroffensive on Horlivka, which was held by the DPR.

    On the 14th of March, Russian forces struck a military training facility near Yavoriv in Lviv Oblast, close to the Polish border. Local governor Maksym Kozytskyy reported that at least 35 people had been killed. On the 18th of March, Russia expanded its attacks to Lviv, with air-launched cruise missiles believed to have come from warplanes flying over the Black Sea.

    The Economist attributed the poor performance of the Russian Air Force to several interlocking failures. Russia could not suppress Ukraine's medium-range surface-to-air missile batteries and lacked precision-guided bombs. Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites forced Russian planes to fly low, where they were vulnerable to Stinger missiles. Russian pilots were also described as lacking the flight hours needed for close ground support.

    Military analyst Sean Wiswesser, writing in 2023, said Russian air forces had "bungled air operations from the outset of the war." After the first month, British observer Justin Bronk counted at least 15 fixed-wing aircraft and 35 helicopters lost by Russia, noting the true total was certainly higher. On the 6th of March, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that 88 Russian aircraft had been destroyed since the war began.

    By early April, renewed Russian troop concentrations around Izium, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk prompted Ukrainian officials to urge remaining eastern residents to evacuate within two to three days.

  • On the 2nd of March 2022, 141 member states of the United Nations General Assembly voted to demand an immediate Russian withdrawal. Seven countries, including Russia, voted against. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to halt military operations. The Council of Europe expelled Russia entirely. Three Baltic states and Poland formally declared Russia a terrorist state.

    Russian banks were cut off from the SWIFT international payments system, and Russia was barred from using European Union airspace. Russian media outlets were banned in several countries. Sanctions forced Russia to redirect oil exports to non-sanctioning countries such as India and shift coal exports from Europe to Asia. Most European countries cancelled nuclear cooperation with Russia.

    Over seventy sovereign states and the European Union sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Nearly fifty countries and the EU provided military assistance. Within Russia, anti-war protesters faced mass arrests and intensifying media censorship. Russia's parliament in March 2022 introduced prison sentences of up to 15 years for publishing what it called "fake news" about military operations.

    In parts of the Global South, public sympathy for Russia was visible, partly due to distrust of American foreign policy. Hackers attacked Russian government websites. Anti-Russian sentiment against Russians living abroad surged across many countries.

    The International Criminal Court opened an investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity, the abduction of Ukrainian children, and genocide against Ukrainians. It subsequently issued arrest warrants for Putin and other Russian officials. On the 23rd of February 2023, the UN General Assembly voted a second time, with 141 member states again demanding Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine.

  • By April 2022, Russian troops had retreated from northern Ukraine. Military analysts had begun a rigorous assessment of how the plan had collapsed. ETH Zurich's Swiss Military Academy published findings in the Journal of Strategic Studies in 2024. Its analysts described the Russian plan as "predicated on a rapid, decisive overthrow of the government in Kyiv, presuming minimal resistance."

    Michael Kofman attributed the failure to an "unworkable concept of operations, which did not anticipate or plan to engage an organised and sustained Ukrainian defence." He also criticized the road-bound deployment of Russian forces and excessive reliance on special operations, including the airborne assault at Hostomel. The November 2022 RUSI report described the plan as built on "false assumptions." It found that Russian forces had been spread too thinly across too many objectives, with no contingency planning. RUSI noted that "if competently executed, these plans could have succeeded."

    Alexander Hill, professor of military history at the University of Calgary, examined Russia's battalion tactical groups. He found they lacked sufficient infantry and artillery support for their armour, funnelled "down relatively narrow axes of advance." Hill wrote that Russian officers "struggled to command multiple BTGs to good effect." Russian forces entered Ukraine with no unified overall commander: each military district fought its own axis. Mason Clark of the Institute for the Study of War said this arrangement led commanders to compete for resources, each effectively fighting their own war.

    Russia appointed Aleksandr Dvornikov as overall commander on the 8th of April 2022. Dvornikov retained his post as Southern Military District commander at the same time. Putin dismissed him in June 2022 but left him in place for several weeks afterward. It was not until October 2022 that Russia appointed a dedicated theatre commander: Sergey Surovikin.

    Kofman noted that Ukrainian forces were overly concentrated in the east, leaving Kyiv "almost completely undefended." RUSI concluded that the Russian deception plan was "largely successful" in drawing Ukrainian attention toward Donbas. At the tactical level, however, RUSI assessed Ukrainian units as "psychologically and practically preparing for this fight for eight years." Hill described Ukrainian forces as having become, since 2014, "a stubborn opponent that was typically difficult to dislodge."

    On the 30th of September 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. None were fully under Russian control at the time. If limited to the territory Russia actually held, roughly 90,000 km2, this would still rank as Europe's largest annexation since World War II. Throughout the conflict, Russia repeatedly struck civilian targets far from active front lines, in attacks described as deliberate and indiscriminate.

Updated

Common questions

What was Russia's plan for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine?

Russia planned to defeat Ukraine within ten days, capture or kill its government, and establish occupation regimes, filtration camps, and eventually annex the country. Documents found inside Russian tanks described a ten-day operation, and Russian forces carried parade uniforms in anticipation of a victory celebration in Kyiv. The decision was reportedly made by Putin and a small circle including national security adviser Nikolai Patrushev and defence minister Sergei Shoigu.

Why did Russia fail to capture Kyiv in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Russian forces were stalled by fierce Ukrainian resistance, effective use of Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger missiles, and poor logistics. A convoy reportedly 64 km in length had made little progress toward Kyiv as of early March 2022. Michael Kofman attributed the failure to an "unworkable concept of operations, which did not anticipate or plan to engage an organised and sustained Ukrainian defence."

What did Zelenskyy say when offered evacuation during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Zelenskyy responded with "The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride." The Washington Post described this as "one of the most-cited lines of the Russian invasion," though the paper noted the quote came from a single source and could not be fully confirmed.

What international response followed the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?

On the 2nd of March 2022, 141 UN General Assembly members voted to demand an immediate Russian withdrawal. The International Court of Justice ordered Russia to halt military operations, the Council of Europe expelled Russia, and dozens of countries imposed sanctions including removal of certain Russian banks from the SWIFT payments system. The International Criminal Court opened an investigation and issued arrest warrants for Putin and other Russian officials.

What happened during the Mariupol siege in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?

The siege of Mariupol began on the 26th of February 2022. By the 18th of March the city was completely encircled, and Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna said on the 27th of March that "more than 85 percent of the whole town is destroyed." Mariupol fell to Russian forces by the 20th of May 2022.

What territory did Russia claim to annex after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine?

On the 30th of September 2022, Russia declared the annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts: Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. None were fully under Russian control at the time of the declaration. If limited to the territory Russia actually held, roughly 90,000 km2, this would still be the largest annexation in Europe since World War II.

All sources

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