Short answers, pulled from the story.
The 1973 oil crisis was caused by an oil embargo declared by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in October 1973, after the United States authorized $2.2 billion in emergency military aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who had warned Washington through multiple channels that an embargo was possible, announced the embargo on the afternoon of the 19th of October 1973.
The price of oil rose by nearly 300% during the 1973 oil crisis, from approximately $3 per barrel to nearly $12 per barrel globally. By late December 1973, OPEC formally raised the posted price from $5 to $11.65 per barrel at a conference in Vienna.
The initial targets were Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The embargo was later extended to Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. OAPEC demanded a complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories beyond the 1949 Armistice border as the condition for lifting it.
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia ended the oil embargo on the 18th of March 1974. The decision came after Anwar Sadat reported that the United States was being more evenhanded in the Arab-Israeli dispute and Henry Kissinger agreed to sell Saudi Arabia weapons previously withheld. Saudi Arabia also held billions of dollars in Western banks, and the inflation triggered by the embargo threatened the value of those holdings.
The Federal Energy Administration estimated in a 1975 report to Congress that the embargo cost roughly 500,000 Americans their jobs and produced a GNP loss of between $10 billion and $20 billion. The crisis prompted a shift toward energy exploration in new regions, increased interest in nuclear power, conservation measures, and a push for what Nixon called Project Independence to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1980.
Most scholars consider the embargo a failure by its own stated goals. Roy Licklieder concluded in his 1988 book Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon that target nations did not change their policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that Israel did not withdraw to the 1949 Armistice line. Robert Lacey wrote that the embargo "did not achieve a single one of its stated objectives," though Daniel Yergin argued it "remade the international economy."